Cyprus Issue

Muserref Nil Tonkul

Marmara University, Political Science and International Relations

The twentieth century witnessed the gradual rise of Greek nationalism and later Turkish nationalism. Greek Cypriots supporting “enosis” which is the union of Cyprus with Greece. Turkish Cypriots demanding “taksim” which is partition of Cyprus. In 1960, Cyprus became an independent state. The republic of Cyprus frustrated both communities’ political goals.[1] Its population was 80 percent Greek Cypriots and 18 percent Turkish Cypriots. After 1974 the reunification of divided Cyprus became the major Greek Cypriot aim.

The independence of the Turkish Cypriots started in 1963 with their being deprived of all their rights by the Greek Cypriot administration and with the beginning of genocides against them by the guerillas and other forces supported from Greece. The Turkish Cypriots lived like prisoners in their own villages and neighborhoods for about ten years. These years indicated between 1963 and 1974. They were subjected to attacks and genocide. But, since the Peace operation of 1974, their independence has been based on both geographical and political foundations. During second ten year term, Turkish Cypriots could not have established their own state. They waited in good faith to facilitate conciliation. They established the “Turkish Federated State of Cyprus” as a federal solution. But, the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus has been declared through the President Rauf Denktaş on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots.

Foreign Ministers of three guarantor powers, Turkey, the United Kingdom and Greece had declared at the end of first Geneva Conference, that there were two autonomous administrations; Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot. After that conference, there were two separate communities.[2] However, Turks in Cyprus were already autonomous.

Even, at present, no other country besides Turkey may have recognized the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Even, this Republic has very restricted international relations. There can be no denying that it is an independent state standing on its own feet and this state cannot be ignored.

Uneasy years followed the establishment of the Republic because the Greek side did not want to implement certain articles of the Constitution. Constitution underlined the partnership status of the Turkish community. Greek Cypriots did not like the rights accorded to the Turkish Cypriots in the constitution. This constitution was against any attempt of Greek hegemony.

Cyprus has a rich history that located at the maritime crossroads of eastern Mediterranean basin. Over the centuries, many invaders, immigrants and settlers come here. Many nationalities such as Greeks, Romans, Byzantines, Lasagnas, Genoese, Venetians, Ottomans, British and Turks seek to take part of Cyprus for themselves. Cypriots which Greek or Turkish is honored their national identity. Ottoman rule dominated with 300 years in island until another foreign power search for influence in the region. In 1878, Turkey and Britain signed an agreement whereby Turkey keep sovereignty of weakening colony, while Britain would shoulder the responsibility of administration of İsland.[3] Aim of Britain was secure the strategic location on the Middle East territory. According to agreement, Britain would protect the sultan’s Asian territories from threat by Russia.

However, Turkey’s recognition of annexation of its territory was not ratified until the 1923 treaty of Lausanne under which it also regularized with the newly independent Greece. British control of Cyprus was welcomed by Greek population. Greeks assumed that; British rule would support or maintain the “enosis” which is unification of Greece with Cyprus. Then, British had offered to unite Cyprus with Greece as early as 1915 on condition that Greece fulfilled its treaty obligations towards to Serbia when it was attacked by Bulgaria.[4] Greek government refused the offer. Georgos ‘Digenis’ Grivas, who founded the Ethniki Organosi tou Kypriakou Agona (EOKA; National Organisation for the Cypriot Struggle). EOKA started to attacks on British administration and on anyone else who is against enosis. British administration offered proposals but all were rejected. %17 minority Turkish Cypriots became alarmed at prospect of being forcibly incorporated into Greece.

Turkey and Greece governments began to take an active role in developments of Greece. Greek Cypriots called as enosis which is a movement to securing the political union of Greece and Cyprus. Turkish Cypriots demanded taksim which is partition of Island of Greece. In 1959, Greek Cypriot leader Archbishop Makarios III and Turkish Cypriot leader Fazıl Küçük met in Zurich with Greek and Turkish leaders as well as representatives of the British government. [5]They came to ratify agreed plan which is independence would be granted to Cyprus with satisfaction all sides. The British retained two bases which are Cyprus would not enter political or economic union with Turkey or Greece nor agree to be partitioned. Greece and Turkey shared a political power on proportional basis, although with less than 20% of total population, the Turkish Cypriots were granted 30% of civil service positions, 33% of seats in The House of Representatives and 40% of positions in the army. Doom fully, British, Greece and Turkey were to be called as “grantor powers” of Island of Cyprus. They had right to intervene in the affairs of Cyprus.

Republic of Cyprus was birth as new and independent in 16 August 1960. Transition from colony to independent nation did not occur easily. First big unrest reached peak when Greek Cypriots suggested amendments regard agreement. That resulted with Turkish Cypriots withdrawal from government. Serious sectarian violence broke out in 1963 which divide Turkish and Greek communities. The United Nations sent to peacekeeping force to the island in 1964 to support British troops operating the so called “Green Line” dividing Lefkosia. The Turkish Cypriots recoiled to ghettos for protecting themselves against aggression. Cyprus has been divided into a Turkish-Cypriot northern region and a Greek-Cypriot southern region since 1974. The United Nations Force in Cyprus [UNFICYP] is responsible for the area that separates the two sides, or the Buffer Zone.[6] The Green Line has been in existence since Christmas Day in 1963, when fighting between the Turkish and Greek communities of newly independent Cyprus resulted in the self-imposed partition of the city into two halves. The UK brokered a cease-fire between the two sides, and the Green Line, named after the green line drawn on a map by a British officer to show the division between the Greeks and Turks, came into being. Since then the barrier has grown from the odd overturned bed and oil drum into a genuine barrier, with an UN-controlled buffer zone that ensures the two sides do not meet. Occupying 3% of the island, it measures 7.4 kilometers at its widest point and 3.3 meters at its narrowest point – in central Nicosia. More than 10,000 people live and/or work in the buffer zone.[7]

Archbishop Makarios III also covertly supported further calls for enosis with Greece. As the communist party gained support, Turkey and Turkish Cypriots became troubled under possible domination of communist party. In 1967, right wing military junta fitted a coup in Greece. So, this weakened the relationships with Cyprus. Makarios’ Cyprus became less desirable for Greeks. Then, in July 1974, a CIA-sponsored and Greek-organized coup occurred in Cyprus. The main aim was elimination of Makarios’ administration and installing a more pro-Western government. A coup aimed to made assassination to Makarios. However, Makarios achieved to escape. A former EOKA member, Nikos Sampson was declared president of Cyprus. Five days later, Turkish forces pull-up at Kyrenia(Girne) to overturn Sampson’s government. There were vigorous resistance but Turks were successful in establishing bridgehead around Kyrenia and linking it with North Nicosia (Lefkoşa).

On 23 July 1974, Greece’s junta fell and democratic government was established under Konstantinos Karamanlis. In the meantime, Sampson was replaced in Cyprus by Glafkos Clerides who was the president of the House of Representatives.[8] The three guarantor powers Britain, Greece and Turkey met for discussion in Geneva, but it proved that impossible to stop Turkish advance until 16 August. Turkey controlled the Northern 37% of Island. In December, Makarios returned to presidency and then Cyprus was divided.[9]

National organization of Cypriot fighters which is called EOKA began operations against British administration in April 1955. The enosis movement faced many difficulties. First obstacle is the British presence in Cyprus Island. British government had opposed the enosis. This is because, Britain seek for their strategic and political interest in Middle East. Control over Cyprus was necessary for their concern. After World War II, Britain retreated which in Palestine, Egypt and India subcontinent. Britain had started looking for control over Cyprus. Then, Cyprus was legally added to Britain territory. Cyprus looked like geographically important, had small population which facilitate controlling the island. In 1960, Britain formally abandoned sovereignty of Whole Island with compromise agreement.

Second obstacle to enosis was the attitude of Greek government. During the World War II and Greek Civil War, Britain supplied financial and military resource to Greece. Britain supported the Greek against the Germany and anti-communist wing in civil war. Nevertheless, Britain did not support enosis movement. In summer of 1954, Greece decided to oppose Britain clearly over Cyprus. How about the future of Cyprus? The Minister of State for Colonies, Mr. Henry Hopkinson definite that some territories could never expect to be fully independent. So, these decisions make shift the relationship between Greece and Britain.

Eventually, Greek government was not behind enosis movement. Greece thought was those how such actions would affect Turkey and Greece relationship. Ultimately, Greece and Turkey had refined a diplomatic understanding. Expansion of NATO protected this newly founded peaceful order. These new political realities gave Greece extra incentives for caution.

Greek caution meant that the enosis cause was driven by Cypriots. Colonel George and Archbishop Makarios were the center of struggle. Evangelos Averoff, the Greek Foreign Minister during the EOKA struggle wrote that Makarios “moved heaven and earth to bring the Cyprus issue to a head.”[10]  Averoff tried to slow Makarios’ movement. Averoff concerned problems such as poverty, hunger, homelessness in Greece. Greek economy and Greek minority in Istanbul would be threatened by cause of enosis. As a result of, Archbishop disagree Averoff. Arcbishop said that liberty of Greeks is superior to people’ living standard. Konstantinos Karamanlis the Greek Prime Minister from October 1955, like Averoff, warned Archbishop that the outlook for enosis was gloomy so that Makarios needed to be more realistic.

Arms and supplies did come to Cyprus from Athens. Grivas pressured figures in the Greek government for more material and diplomatic support. EOKA struggle was conducted firstly by Greek Cypriots for Greek Cypriots. Only one or two Greek nationals involved the EOKA operations in 1950’s. Grivas wanted only Cypriots to contribute this struggle. Grivas explained his choice and quotation is “I had decided to use only Cypriots in the fight, to show the world that our campaign was purely Cypriot in origin and conduct; I knew, besides, that if I began recruiting men on the Greek mainland, the secret would be all over Athens in a few days.”[11]

Moreover, Grivas had his own clear ideas about EOKA’s strategy. However, wishes of Makarios were different from Grivas in some sense. Historical documents show that Makarios preferred sabotage, bombing and harassment. Fighters would be armed with explosives and their target must be buildings not the individuals. Grivas hoped to inflict real demage on the British security service. Repressive movements in Cyprus would create international pressure against Britain occupation. Grivas’ assessment was far closer to the aim. However, neither Grivas nor Makarios seemed to take much account of the third obstacle to enosis –Turkish Cypriots or Turkey-.

Turkey and Turkish Cypriots was the most formidable obstacle against enosis. Turkish Cypriots pushed for Turkish arms and Turkish military advisers to create Turkish Resistance Organization (TMT) in 1958.[12] They renounced partition in 1959 and they claimed detachment of Turkish Troops in Cyprus as a part of final peace settlement. The attitude of Turkey and Turkish Cypriots was always negative for enosis. Turkish Cypriots feared to feel second-class citizen in Cyprus.

British wanted to avoid any debate between Greece and Turkey. If there were any Greco-Turkish hostility, stability of Eastern Mediterranean, to NATO and to British position in Middle East would be in danger. Many members of British government supported to Turkish officials to talk about Cyprus in international area. This was done to soften the effect of Greek action at United Nations. When the EOKA campaign began, Greek Cypriots began leaving the force due to some reasons which is that some of them supported the EOKA and others feared EOKA. The British government in Cyprus needed to increase their police force because of dealing with EOKA. By the end of 1957, Turkish-Cypriots had decreased the less than half the force while British policemen had increased to 18%. By the end of 1958, only 47% of force was Turkish, 22% of was British. [13]

Finally, it is important to remember that the violence between the two communities during the summer of 1958 was not flashed by the British. A bomb planted by Turkish-Cypriots at the Turkish ministry of information sparked the violence in the summer of 1958. Britain and Greece were appalled by the cynical and dangerous act. Turks naturally blamed Greek-Cypriots, but British and American intelligence had evidence that Turkish-Cypriots had planted the bomb. Rauf Denktash has subsequently admitted this fact. It is another example of how Turkey and Turkish-Cypriots were genuinely against enosis. They were willing to do anything to defeat it. In the end, a combination of fear, violence, diplomacy and political expediency defeated the enosis cause in Cyprus. The agreement of 1960 prohibited enosis, but the cause was not officially abandoned until after the invasion of 1974. ( bu paragrafa footnote koy)

Taksim is idea of the participation of Cyprus before 1974 operation and is the participation of North Cyprus after 1974 operation. In 1951 Greece tried to tackle the Cyprus manner. After 1955, Turkey started to follow “taksim” policy. 29 August 1955, ABD and United Kingdom invited Turkey and Greece to London.[14] Greece wanted to be independence. Turkey preferred to behave status quoist however if United Kingdom would withdraw from island, Cyprus is gave to Turkey.

President of KTP (Cyprus Turkish Party) which is Fazıl Küçük organized “Ya Taksim Ya Ölüm” demonstration in Turkey approximate 50 in Turkey between 1956-1958 years and Taksim case was started to support by Turkish public opinion.[15] Barely, when meeting with United Kingdom was inefficient, Greece’s enosis and Turkey’s taksim plans were not occurred. Turkey accepted the British solution for the establishmentof a federal republic of Cyprus which Britain imposed and forced both sides to accept. As a result of this solution the London and Zurich Treaties were signed between Britain, Greece and Turkey in 1959, and the Federal Republic of Cyprus was established under the guarantor-ship of three parties mentioned.

In July 1974, the then ruling junta in Greece organized a military coup against President Makarios, presenting Turkey with the pretext it had long sought for. Alleging a right of “intervention” as guarantor of the 1960 Constitution, Turkey invaded Cyprus on 20 July 1974 “to restore security and order and to protect the Turkish Cypriots”. These assertions, however, cannot be sustained. The right of “intervention” which is provided for by the treaties of Zurich and London does not explicitly involve the use of force. Even supposing that this were the case, the U.N. Charter explicitly excludes the use of force and its provisions predominate over all possible international agreements to the contrary, as the Charter itself emphasizes. Apart from this, the Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktash himself, had at the time characterized the coup as an “internal affair” of the Greek Cypriots, stressing that it did not affect the Turkish Cypriot community.

Moreover, in cases of disruption of the constitutional order, the Treaty of Guarantee provided for consultations between the guarantor powers (i.e. Turkey, Britain and Greece). Only if concerted action were to prove impossible, did the Treaty of Guarantee reserve to each of the guarantor powers the right to act unilaterally with the exclusive aim to restore the constitutional order. Turkey, however, never entered into consultations before invading the country whose territorial integrity it had guaranteed. In addition when, after a few days, the constitutional order had been restored, the Turkish forces not only refrained from withdrawing, but proceeded to the second stage of the invasion, while negotiations were still taking place in Geneva. Thus, Turkey finally carried out its expansionist plans, occupying 37% of Cyprus and turning 200.000 Greek Cypriots into refugees.[16]

Over 1.500 Greek Cypriots and Greeks have been missing, as a result of the 1974 military operations carried out by Turkey. A special Committee, established by the U.N. in 1981, has been assigned with the task to investigate their fate.[17] It had not produced any results until recently, owing to the unwillingness of the Turkish side to cooperate.

In a television interview broadcast on March 1st, 1996, the Turkish Cypriot leader Mr. Denktash declared that the missing Greeks and Greek Cypriots had in fact been killed in 1974 in cold blood by Turkish Cypriot irregulars and, therefore, the whole issue should be considered to be closed.[18] His confession should not be allowed to obstruct the special Committee’s work. This purely humanitarian aspect of the Cyprus tragedy requires full and exhaustive investigation, away from any political expediency, so that safe and indisputable conclusions are reached concerning the fate of every missing person.

The Cyprus issue is a typical international problem of invasion and occupation of one member-state of the UN by another, namely Turkey. Twenty-three years after the Turkish invasion and defying a series of U.N. Resolutions, Turkey refuses to withdraw its occupation forces. At present, more than 35.000 Turkish troops are illegally stationed in the northern part of Cyprus, which is characterized by the Secretary General of the U.N., as one of the most highly militarized areas in the world.

The international community has expressed itself virtually unanimously on the Cyprus issue, through a great number of Resolutions of international fora, such as the General Assembly and the Security Council of the U.N., the European Parliament, the Council of Europe, the Non-Aligned Movement and the Commonwealth. A number of U.N. Resolutionsin particular, have repeatedly addressed the Cyprus situation in all its aspects. They provide, inter alia, for the withdrawal of the Turkish army (Resolutions 353/1974 of the Security Council and 3212/1974, 37/253/1983 of the General Assembly) and the return of the refugees to their homes in safety (Resolution 3212/1974 of the General Assembly, later endorsed by Security Council Resolution 365/1975).[19]

They also affirm that the present status quo is not acceptable and outline the main principles on which a solution should be based. In this respect, in its Resolution 939/1994the Security Council “reaffirms its position that a Cyprus settlement must be based on a State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality and a single citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded, and comprising two politically equal communities as described in the relevant Security Council Resolutions in a bicommunal and bizonal federation, and that such a settlement must exclude union in whole or in part with any other country or any form of partition or secession”.[20]

None of the above mentioned Resolutions was accepted and implemented by the Turkish side. On the contrary, in November 1983, in the middle of yet another U.N. initiative, the Turkish Cypriot leadership, at the instigation of Turkey, proclaimed an “independent state” in the occupied part of Cyprus. United Nations Security Council Resolutions 541 (1983) and 550 (1984) condemned the unilateral declaration as well as all subsequent secessionist acts, declared them illegal and invalid and called for their immediate withdrawal. They also called upon all states not to recognize the purported state set up by secessionist acts and not to facilitate or in any way assist the secessionist entity. Turkey is the only state in the world which has accorded recognition to the illegal “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”.

The European Parliament has also adopted several Resolutions concerning all aspects of the Cyprus issue (i.e. Resolution 17.11.1983 denouncing the secessionist entity, Resolution 15.12.1988 condemning the destruction of the cultural heritage in the occupied territories, Resolution 15.3.1990 urging the Turkish Government to demonstrate the necessary volition and a spirit of cooperation with a view to resuming the Intercommunal negotiations, Resolution 21.1.1993 calling on Turkey to withdraw its occupation troops, Resolution 12.7.1995 expressing its support to the accession of Cyprus to the E.U., Resolution 28.3.1996 condemning the statement by the Turkish Cypriot leader Mr Denktash, that there was no need to search any further for the persons missing as a result of the Turkish invasion because Turkish Cypriot irregulars had killed them, and welcoming the proposal of President Clerides for the demilitarization of Cyprus).[21]

As regards the Council of Europethe Parliamentary Assembly has adopted a number of Resolutions which condemn the illegal declaration of an “independent” state in 1983, call for the restoration of the unity and territorial integrity of Cyprus, for the respect of the human rights of its inhabitants, as well as for the withdrawal of foreign troops (Recommendations 974/1983, 1056/1987, Resolution 816/1984).

The Cypriot 1960 Constitution and the Northern Ireland 1985 Anglo‐Irish Agreement are compared to explore the third‐party intervention roles of bilateral external ethno‐guarantors in protracted conflicts in Cyprus and Northern Ireland.[22] Ethno‐guarantors have intervened in both of these long‐standing intractable ethno‐territorial conflicts between local ethnic groups with competing claims to the same territory.

Evaluation of occasion can be lined up chronologically. After determination of Green Line in 1963, Turkey openly declared that it will start a military operation to Cyprus. Makarios and Papandreu stopped the attacks against the TCs after they learned Turkey’s operation aim. US President Johnson warned Turkey not to make military operation to Cyprus. 114 Turkish Cypriots were died and 468 of them were wounded between 1963and1964.[23] In 1967, Greek junta started and continued for 7 years until the Turkish Cypriots Peace operation. Greece offered Turkey “enosis” on the negotiations. Turkey reacted hard to Greece and Greece Police Forces attacked to the Turkish villages. The Greek attacks started again and Turkey took the decision for military operation. Turkish Jets flied over Cyprus. US said again to Turkey not to intervene Cyprus. The Turkish ships returned. In 1970, Makarios said he is stronlgy wanting for the islands annexion to Greece but the situation isn’t suitable for it. EOKA members reacted to him and said that Makarios gave up from the enosis ideas. The new Bülent Ecevit government on Turkey declared its federation ideas on Cyprus. In 1974, Makarios was kicked from the governance by Greek Junta’s military offices. Nicos Sampson declared “Cyprus Hellen Republic.” Turkey used its guarantorship right and made a successful military operation on 1974. [24]

Having the presence of Turkish troops in the north, British bases and a UN peacekeeping mission, Cyprus has been defined by the UN as “one of most densely militarized areas in the world.” (United Nations Secretary General Report, S/1995/1020, 10 December 1995) The Security Council established UNFICYP through Resolution 186 (1964) on 4 March 1964 to prevent further fighting between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities.[25] UNFICYP is one of the longest-running UN peacekeeping missions. In the absence of a formal ceasefire agreement, UNFICYP’s 929 total uniformed personnel, including 860 troops and 69 police deal with hundreds of incidents each year.

Turkey keeps around 30,000 troops in the north of island. The army’s headquarters are in Kyrenia. TOURDYK (Turkish forces in Cyprus under the Treaty of Guarantee) is stationed at Orta Keuy village near Nicosia.[26] Turkish naval command and outpost are based at Famagusta and Kyrenia respectively. Turkish airforce personnel are based at Lefkoniko, Krini and other airfields. The Turkish airforce is stationed at Adana. Since 1960, Britain retains two areas of sovereign territory on the island. Covering 98 square kilometers, it enables the UK to maintain a permanent military presence at a strategic point in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The Cyprus issue is a flagrant case of continued mass violations of basic human rights and freedoms by Turkey, in breach of the purposes and principles of the U.N. Charter and major international instruments in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Numerous Resolutions of the U.N., including those of the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Commission on Human Rights, the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination have been adopted over these 24 years, concerning all aspects of violations of human rights in Cyprus.[27] Turkey has failed to comply with any of them.

Furthermore, the Commission of Human Rights of the Council of Europe, an impartial judicial institution, having examined the three recourses of the Cyprus Government against Turkey for multiple violations of the European Convention of Human Rights (Applications 6780/74, 6950/75 and 8007/77), adopted two reports (in 1976 and 1983) in which it is concluded that Turkey is guilty of gross violations of human rights in Cyprus from 1974 onwards.

Although the British Government gave up sovereignty over whole island. The Suez Crisis in 1956 showed the Britain cannot act in region successfully against the wishes of United States. Britain also relies on its alliance of Turkey for reinforce region. Now, position of Turkey is more complicated. Invasion of 1974 allowed the Turkish government de-facto partition of island. Turkey’s military presence in Cyprus continued. The final version of Annan Plan was rejected by Greek-Cypriots even tough EU (including Greece), The United States, Turkey and Turkish Cypriots were all in favor of it.

Painting Greek Cypriots as rejectionist after 2004 referendum, forces are moving to end the isolation of North. They have a desire for solution that would return sovereignty to a Greek-Cypriot majority. Demographic changes in North shows high birth rates and immigration from Turkey became more part of Cyprus. Many European leaders think that Turkish entry of EU is difficult due to Cyprus issue. Turkey remains an important ally for many European countries and for United States. If Greek-Cypriot political leaders do not wish to accept the status quo, they face three basic choices. The first is to put their faith in the EU. Cypriot politicians can hope that the EU will support better terms than what has previously been offered by the United Nations. Perhaps Brussels’ entry requirements for Turkey and rulings in favor of Greek-Cypriots, combined with diplomatic pressure will force Turkey to compromise. Second, Greek-Cypriot politicians can try and return to the plan rejected in 2004. They can try to generate public support for it, arguing that the familiar, if flawed, terms of the Annan Plan are better than an unknown solution at an unknown future date. Third, they can chart a new course, create new alliances and partnerships and press to change the balance of opinion about Cyprus globally. It would require enormous diplomatic work and effort, but perhaps countries could be shifted countries away from Turkey and towards the Cypriot point of view. (bu paragrafa footnote koy)

The choice, in the end, is one of values. In the 1950s, most Greek-Cypriots supported EOKA in a struggle for enosis. Enosis was pursued because becoming part of the Greek state was more valuable to Greek-Cypriots than their security, their prosperity, or peace. The cause was defeated largely because the goal of enosis was uncompromising and out of step with the realities of the situation. The choices of today are also a question of values: the importance of a Greek identity in Cyprus, the trust in the EU and its institutions, and the willingness to reach out to new partners to solve an old problem.

Bibliography

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[1] Zaim Necatigil “The Cyprus Question and The Turkish Position  in International Law” (Oxford University Press,1993), p.13

[2] Robert Stephens “Cyprus a Place of Arms” (Pall Mall Press London,1966), p.21

[3] Şükrü Tarun “Türkiye, İngiltere ve Yunanistan Arasında Kıbrıs’ın Politik Durumu” (Gazeteciler Matbaası, 1956), p.33

[4] Peter Loizos “Intercommunal Killing in Cyprus” (Michigan University Press, 1988), p.647

[5] Sabahattin İsmail “ Kıbrıs Sorununun Kökleri” (Akdeniz Haber Ajansı Yayınları,2000), p.247

[6] Robert Stephans “Cyprus a Place of Arms” (Pall Mall Press London,1966), p.64

[7] Rebecca Bryant “Cyprus and The Politics of Memory” (I.B. Touris & Co Ltd., 2012), p.32

[8] Yiannis Papadakis “Divided Cyprus:Modernity,History and an Island in Conflict” (Indiana University Press,2006), p.84

[9] Olga Demetriou “South European Society and Politics” (University of Pennsylvania Press,2006), p.303

[10] Yiannis Papadakis “Divided Cyprus: Modernity, History and an Island in Conflict” (Indiana University Press, 2006), p.26

[11] Uğur Uzer,Mehmet Cengiz “Kıbrıs Sorunu” (Ankara Barosu Yayını,2002), p.105

[12] Bülent Ecevit “ The Cyprus Question” (Kema Press,1984), p.25

[13] Robert Stephans “Cyprus a Place of Arms” (Pall Mall Press London, 1966), p.108

[14] Şükrü Tarun “Türkiye, İngiltere ve Yunanistan Arasında Kıbrıs’ın Politik Durumu” (Gazeteciler Matbaas,1956), p.73

[15] Sabahattin İsmail “Kıbrıs Sorununun Kökleri” (Akdeniz Haber Ajansı Yayınları,2000), p.32

[16] Peter Lozios “Intercommunal Killing in Cyprus” (Michigan University Press,1988), p.639

[17] Olga Demetriou “ South European Society and Politics” (University of Pennsylvania Press,2006) p.301

[18] Peter Lozios “Intercommunal Killing in Cyprus” (Michigan University Press,1988), p.653

[19] Uğur Uzer, Mehmet Cengiz “Kıbrıs Sorunu” (Ankara Barosu Yayını,2002),p.52

[20] Rebecca Bryant “Cyprus and The Politics of Memory” (I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2012), p.207

[21] Yiannis Papadakis “Divided Cyprus: Modernity, History and an Island in Conflict” (Indiana University Press, 2006), p.48

[22] Rebecca Bryant “Cyprus and The Politics of Memory” (I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 2012), p.104

[23] Zaim Necatigil “The Cyprus Question and The Turkish Position  in International Law” (Oxford University Press,1993), p.31

[24] Robert Stephens “Cyprus a Place of Arms” (Pall Mall Press London,1966), p.66

[25] Robert Stephans “Cyprus a Place of Arms” (Pall Mall Press London,1966), p.98

[26] Yiannis Papadakis “Divided Cyprus: Modernity, History and an Island in Conflict” (Indiana University Press, 2006), p.36

[27] Zaim Necatigil “The Cyprus Question and The Turkish Position  in International Law” (Oxford University Press,1993), p.102